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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
PRICE V. STATE: INCONSISTENT VERDICTS IN CRIMINAL 
JURY TRIALS ARE NO LONGER PERMISSIBLE. 
By: Alison Karch 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland changed long-standing common 
law by holding that inconsistent jury verdicts in criminal cases are no 
longer allowed. Price v. State, 405 Md. lO, 949 A.2d 619 (2008). The 
court concluded that a jury verdict of guilty, which is flatly 
inconsistent with the jury's verdict of not guilty on another count, is 
illogical and contrary to law. Id. at 29,949 A.2d at 630. 
On November 20, 2002, two Baltimore City police officers 
observed about fifteen people congregating in a breezeway of an 
apartment complex known for the sale of drugs. The police officers 
observed Lawrence Price, Jr. ("Price") surrounded by others who 
exchanged money for small objects. Price and others ran when the 
officers approached the breezeway. When the officers caught and 
apprehended Price, he threw a bag that contained a handgun and u.s. 
currency. 
Price was charged in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City with 
various drug offenses, including drug trafficking crimes. In addition, 
Price was charged with the possession of a firearm during and in 
relation to a drug trafficking crime. At trial, the judge instructed the 
jury that to find Price guilty of possessing a firearm during and in 
relation to a drug trafficking crime, they also had to find him guilty of 
at least one of the drug trafficking crimes. The jury acquitted Price of 
all the drug trafficking charges. However, despite the trial judge's 
instructions, the jury found Price guilty of possession of a firearm 
during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. 
Price moved to strike the guilty verdict on the firearms charge on 
the grounds that it was inconsistent with the not guilty verdicts to the 
drug trafficking crimes. The trial court denied the motion. Price 
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which upheld 
the guilty verdict holding that inconsistent verdicts are generally 
permitted in jury trials. Price petitioned for writ of certiorari, which 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted. 
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The Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized that there are no 
Maryland statutes or procedural rules that relate to inconsistent 
verdicts generally or to specific types of inconsistent verdicts. Price, 
405 Md. at 18, 949 A.2d at 624. The court previously held that 
inconsistent verdicts in jury trials were permissible in criminal cases. 
Id. (citing State v. Williams, 397 Md. 172, 189, 916 A.2d 294, 305 
(2007)). Inconsistent jury verdicts were tolerated because the 
"inconsistencies may be the product of lenity, mistake, or a 
compromise to reach unanimity." Price, 405 Md. at 19, 949 A.2d at 
624 (quoting Gal/oway v. State, 371 Md. 379,408,809 A.2d 653,671 
(2002)). 
Prior to this decision, inconsistent jury verdicts were the only 
inconsistent verdicts still permitted under Maryland law. Price, 405 
Md. at 19-20, 949 A.2d at 624-25. Examples of inconsistent verdicts 
no longer tolerated include: (1) when a judge is involved in rendering 
one of the inconsistent verdicts; (2) when the judge has failed to give 
an instruction on the consistency of verdicts; or (3) when the jury has 
returned guilty verdicts on two inconsistent counts. ld. at 19-20, 949 
A.2d at 625. The trial court, in its discretion, does not have to accept 
inconsistent verdicts and may grant its own relief. ld. at 21, 949 A.2d 
at 626. The court determined that it is the role of the jury to decide a 
criminal case according to the law. ld. Further, it is within the duty of 
the trial court to set aside the verdict when the jury has misapplied the 
law and returned verdicts that are inconsistent with both the law and 
the judge's instructions. ld. However, the court has never established 
a criteria to guide trial courts in deciding whether or not to accept 
inconsistent verdicts. ld. 
The court previously held that in civil trials, irreconcilably 
inconsistent jury verdicts are not allowed. ld. (citing Southern 
Management v. Taha, 378 Md. 461, 467, 836 A.2d 627, 630 (2003)). 
The court explained that if the traditional reasons for tolerating 
inconsistent jury verdicts are insufficient in civil cases, those reasons 
clearly are not sufficient in criminal cases. Price, 405 Md. at 26, 949 
A.2d at 629. In civil cases, generally only money is at stake, but in 
criminal cases the defendant's liberty or life is in jeopardy. ld. at 22, 
949 A.2d at 626. The court stated that it was unwilling to give less 
protection to a criminal defendant than it has given to a civil 
defendant. ld. at 22, 949 A.2d at 626 (citing Galloway, 371 Md. at 
417, 809 A.2d at 676). Based on this analysis, the court concluded 
that there is no longer any justification for tolerating inconsistent jury 
trial verdicts. Price, 405 Md. at 22, 949 A.2d at 626. 
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According to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, to uphold the 
inconsistent jury verdicts of guilty in Price would be to repudiate the 
principles set forth in previous decisions of this court. Id. Ultimately, 
the court held that while inconsistent verdicts were allowed under 
Maryland common law, the court has the authority under the state 
constitution to change the common law. Id. Inconsistent jury verdicts 
shall no longer be allowed. Id. at 29, 949 A.2d at 630. 
The concurring opinion set out the proper procedure that a 
defendant and a trial judge should follow when an inconsistent verdict 
occurs. Id. at 35, 949 A.2d at 634 (Harrell, J., concurring). An 
objection to inconsistent verdicts is only allowed by the defendant and 
not by the prosecution. Id. at 42 n. 10, 949 A.2d at 638 n. 10 (Harrell, 
J., concurring). If a defendant does not note his or her objection to the 
allegedly inconsistent verdicts prior to the verdicts becoming final and 
the discharge of the jury, the claim is waived. Id. at 40, 949 A.2d at 
637 (Harrell, J., concurring). Upon a timely objection, the trial court 
should instruct or re-instruct the jury on the need for consistency and 
the range of possible verdicts. Id. at 41-42, 949 A.2d at 638 (Harrell, 
J., concurring). The jury would then be allowed to resolve the 
inconsistency. Id. (Harrell, 1., concurring). Judge Harrell opined that 
the court's holding should only apply to verdicts that are legally 
inconsistent and not those that are factually inconsistent. Id. at 35, 949 
A.2d at 634 (Harrell, J., concurring). 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland changed the common law by 
prohibiting inconsistent jury verdicts in criminal cases. The court 
places the responsibility on the defense and on the trial judge to ensure 
that justice is fulfilled. The lower courts now are responsible for 
making sure that verdicts returned from the jury are legally consistent. 
Price only discusses legally inconsistent verdicts and opens the door to 
future debate on the permissibility of factually inconsistent verdicts. 
This holding helps guarantee that defendants in criminal trials have the 
fair trial that they are entitled. 
